On definite kinds by Borik, Olga & Espinal, M. Teresa
 Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes 
41 | 2012
New perspectives on genericity at the interfaces
On definite kinds






Presses universitaires de Vincennes
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 September 2012





Olga Borik and M. Teresa Espinal, « On deﬁnite kinds », Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes [Online],
41 | 2012, Online since 01 September 2014, connection on 20 April 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/rlv/2104  ; DOI : 10.4000/rlv.2104 
© Presses universitaires de Vincennes
Olga BORIK and M. Teresa ESPINAL 
Departament de Filologia Catalana / Centre de Lingüística Teòrica 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
ON DEFINITE KINDS 1
1. This research has been funded by the following two research grants awarded by the 
Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (HUM 2006-13295-C02-02, FFI2011-23356), 
and by a grant awarded by the Generalitat de Catalunya to the Centre de Linguística Teòrica (2009SGR-1073). The irst author also acknowledges a Ramón y Cajal award (RyC-2008-02856), and the second author an ICREA Acadèmia award.
Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes 41 – 2012 – p. 123-146
AbstrAct
In this paper we defend three hypotheses. First, all languages that have 
Determiners (null or overt) have deinite kinds, a possibility which does not 
prevent languages from using other means to refer to kinds. Second, kinds 
are referred to by deinite DPs with no Number involved. Third, the subkind 
interpretation is built on Number. We will provide empirical support for these 
hypotheses based on a contrastive analysis of two languages that show opposite 
strategies for marking deiniteness: Spanish, a Romance language with articles, 
and Russian, a Slavic language with no article. We predict that deinite kinds 
cannot combine with predicates that encode plurality, cannot trigger a generic 
interpretation with s-level predicates, and have an interpretation that differs 
from the one associated to deinite plurals. 
Keywords
Kind interpretation, deinite determiner, number, Russian, Spanish.
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1. Introduction
A central topic in the literature on genericity is how different types of languages refer to kinds. In this respect, a well-established assumption, since Carlson (1977/1980), is that bare plurals (BPs) in English (E) allow for a generic use, a reading that arises because BPs are taken to denote a particular type of entity: names of kinds of things. This view relects the fact that BPs in E may occur as arguments of generic sentences (with kind-level and individual-
level predicates). However, a still unresolved and poorly understood phenomenon is the question why E also allows the use of deinite generics, as pointed out by Carlson (1977/1980:274-280) and Chierchia (1998:379-383):
(1) a. The owl is common/widespread/fast disappearing/often intelligent.  (Carlson 1977/1980:276, (32a))
 b. Owls are common/widespread/fast disappearing/often intelligent.   (Carlson 1977/1980:276, (32b))
In this paper we will challenge the standard assumption that the generic or kind reading for NPs is basically modeled over pluralities (Chierchia 1998), and we will focus on so-called “singular” deinite generics as in (1a). We will defend the following hypotheses:H1. All languages that have Determiners (null or overt) have deinite 
kinds, a possibility which does not prevent languages from using other means to refer to kinds (e.g. bare plurals in E).
H2. Kinds are referred to by deinite DPs with no Number involved. We will provide empirical support for this hypothesis based on a contrastive analysis of two languages that show opposite strategies for marking deiniteness: Spanish (S), a Romance language with articles, which does not allow for generic BPs (Laca 1990; Dobrovie-Sorin and Laca 1996, 2003), and 
Russian (R), a Slavic language with no article.
H3. In these languages the subkind interpretation is built on 
Number. In combination with i(ndividual)-level and k(ind)-level predicates argument DPs type-shift their reading from objects to subkinds, otherwise the 
interpretation crashes.The prediction we make in this paper is that languages that have (null or overt) Determiners do not differ with respect to deinite generics: they all have them. However, we think that languages differ a lot in the domain of pluralities 
(cf. Farkas and de Swart 2007).
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2. The kind interpretation
2.1. The deinite generic The N according to Carlson
Carlson distinguishes between two classes of individuals: objects and kinds. Objects can occupy one place at a time. Kinds may function in such a way as to be in many places at a given time. Kinds also serve to tie objects as well as stages together to make them manifestations of the same type of thing. Objects only serve to tie stages together, and never other objects. Unlike kinds, objects cannot have stages that appear at various distinct places at a given 
instant. 
We interpret this view as corresponding to an extensional view of kinds, which can be represented in a semi-lattice structure (2), where the kind 




According to Carlson, semantically, there is a great deal of similarity between the deinite generic and the bare plural. Indeed, he claims that the owl and owls 
behave entirely in parallel.
(3) a. The owl has two eyes in the front of its skull.
 b. Owls have two eyes in the front of their skull.  (Carlson 1980:276, exs. (31))
Let us consider in more detail the deinite generic vis-à-vis the bare plural. Carlson takes both to be NPs that denote the property set of a kind. He claims that the deinite generic appears to share most (but not all, apparently) of the individual-level properties of the bare plural that corresponds to it. The deinite generic is much more limited in the sorts of NP’s it may productively occur in than the bare plural, the latter being virtually unbounded. Referring to E, Carlson states that deinite generics are much more restricted in the distribution than bare plurals because they can only refer to well-established kinds. He also regards the deinite generic as a proper name: the fact that it takes the deinite article makes it seem to be much closer syntactically to proper names, as many proper names have as a part of the name the deinite article as well (The Hague, 
The Mississipi, The Bronx, etc.). According to this view the deinite generic appears to be more name-like than the bare plural in several respects, but Carlson attributes to both deinite generics and bare plurals a name-like status. 
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Our reservations with respect to Carlson’s analysis are the following. 
First of all, even if we consider the extensional counterpart of owls as denoting 
the intension of a set (i.e., a function that picks out all existent owls in any possible world at any given time), it seems to us that the owl cannot denote in the same way the intension of a set. The denotation of plural nominal expressions in English seems to be closer to mass nouns, but different from the denotation of deinite kinds, which are similar to atomic entities.Secondly, Carlson highlights a number of similarities between bare plural kinds and deinite kinds, but never explains the relevant differences between them might be, apart from pointing out the restrictions involved in the use of deinite generics. We argue that these expressions have different denotations relying on the presence or absence of number.
In the account that we are going to propose in this paper, we rather follow Jespersen (1927), who characterizes the deinite generic as denoting the species itself. Plurals, on the other hand, denote all members of the species. We will also rely on the hypothesis that there is no ambiguous Determiner. Romance languages may show overt Determiners preceding proper names. The syntactic form and semantics of this deinite Determiner is the same as for deinite kinds, where an overt Determiner precedes a common noun. We will come back to this hypothesis in Section 3.
2.2. Singular generic The according to Chierchia
In Cherchia’s proposal, kinds are “individual concepts of a certain sort: functions from worlds (or situations) into pluralities, the sum of all instances of the kind” (Chierchia 1998:349). Kinds are derived from properties by the 
down operator ∩, which is deined as follows (Chierchia 1988:351): 
(4) For any property P and world/situation s,
  λs ι P
s
, if λs ι P
s
 is in K (set of kinds);  undeined, otherwise
(i.e., the down operator maps a property to the greatest element in the extension of P in a world). Under this view, the representation of the BP kind-denoting NP owls is as in (5):
(5) ∩OWL = o
By contrast, singular generic NPs with the deinite article the (like the owl) pick out a group individual which do not allow any reference to its members. This accounts for the fact that these nominal expressions cannot combine with 
predicates that require a count interpretation (cf. (6a) and (7a)). In this respect, deinite kinds show a contrast with “regular” bare plural kind NPs, as shown in (6):
∩P ={
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(6) a.  *The owl is numerous. b. Owls are numerous. 
(7) a.  *The Jones family is numerous.  b.  The members of the Jones family are numerous. 
According to Chierchia, the semantic derivation of singular generic NPs is complex and proceeds with the following two steps, as illustrated in (8):
(8) a.  Step1: a MASS operator applies to the denotation of a singular count noun like owl to produce MASS(owl). It has a mass reference, i.e. it applies both to atomic owls and pluralities of owls.  b.  Step2: the iota-operator applies, but its semantics is different for count and mass noun denotations (Chierchia 1998:380):
   ιP, if P is a count noun denotation   g(ιP), if P is a mass noun denotation   (where g is a function from pluralities into groups)
The resulting representation of the deinite kind NP the owl is given in (9): 
(9) the owl ⇒ THE(MASS(owl) = g(ι MASS(owl))
It should be noted that, according to the analysis of Chierchia, both “the sums of all instances of the kind” (bare plural kinds) and groups (deinite singular kinds) are atomic, although they have different internal structures. But we think that this, in fact, poses a conceptual problem, since kinds denoted by BPs seem to have a dual nature: on the one hand, they are assumed to represent “the sums of all instances” or “the largest plurality” and, on the other hand, kinds constitute a subset of atomic entities in the semi-lattice structure. Apart from this, we have an empirical objection to Chierchia’s analysis. It should be observed that we do not normally ind generic the-NPs in episodic sentences (as noted by Chierchia himself, but also Krifka 2004). 2 Given that the deinite article in his analysis is basically assumed to be ambiguous (cf. (8b)), it is unclear why (10) does not convey this ambiguity. In particular, nothing seems to prevent that in (10), which is an episodic sentence with a stage-level 
2. Krifka actually notices that the group semantics might explain the use of deinite generics in sentences like The American customer bought 74.000 BMWs last year or The rat 
reached Australia in 1770. In The Generic book these examples are analyzed as collective predications which attribute important properties of members of the group to the group, although we don’t see how this interpretation would work for the irst example (i.e., members of the group of American customers bought 74.000 BMWs????). Chierchia (1998:379) discusses a similar example (??The tiger is roaring in the zoo), where he comes up with a context to save the example.
THE P = {
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predicate, the derivation in (9) applies, giving the generic interpretation to the subject. 3
(10)  The owl hunted/was hunting a rat this morning.
In the account that we are going to develop in this paper, we assume that BNs do not have to be shifted into a mass reading to derive a kind interpretation and we argue that deinite kinds do not rely on the notion of plurality at all. Furthermore, we treat the deinite D uniformly as the iota operator without encoding any sort of ambiguity. With regard to the empirical problem posed in (10), we rely on the hypothesis that deinite kinds do not combine with stage 
level predicates, as will be explained in the next section. 
3. The denotation of nominal expressions and deinite kinds
Let us start with the assumption that the canonical syntactic structure (Chierchia 1998, Longobardi 2001, Zamparelli 1995) for nominal expressions in languages with number morphology and determiners is that given in (11):
(11) [DP D [NumP Num [NP N ]]] 
This tripartite syntactic organization schema is not, however, the only possible one, since nominal structures may lack a Number speciication (12b), a Determiner (12c), or both (12a). 
(12) a. [NP N ]
 b.  [DP D [NP N ]]
 c. [NumP Num [NP N ]]
Therefore, we have to consider three additional syntactic structures in 12(a-c) that emerge from this schema and which have been postulated respectively for (i) bare count nominals (BNs) in object position in several Creole and Romance 
languages (Déprez 2005, Dobrovie-Sorin et al. 2006); (ii) singular expressions occurring in subject position in languages such as Brazilian Portuguese (Munn and Schmitt 2005); and (iii) existential BPs in object position in languages such as Catalan, Romanian and S (Dobrovie-Sorin and Laca 1996, 2003; 
Dobrovie-Sorin et al. 2006). The fact that these different syntactic possibilities exist does not imply that languages necessarily have predicates that select for these different types of nominal expressions (see below in this section). We think that semantic arguments are basically of two types: individual objects or kinds, but the four structures in (11) and (12) offer more possibilities and, therefore, additional mechanisms are needed in natural languages to match the 
3. The prediction of Chierchia’s analysis with respect to bare plurals are not discussed 
in this paper. 
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requirements of the predicate with the meaning of the nominal expression it combines with. Let us focus on the semantics of (12a) in contrast to (12b). We start from the assumption that of the four nominal structures in (11) and (12), the “least marked” one (see Swart and Zwarts 2009) is the representation in (12a), which corresponds to BNs when occurring as objects of verbs and as objects 
of prepositions, the situation illustrated for S in (13). 
(13) a. Este  profesor  tiene  libro. (P. Goenaga, p.c.)  this  professor  has  book  ‘This professor has a book/ has published.’ (It could be one book, or more 
than one) b. Estuvieron en  prisión.
  were  in  prison  ‘They spent time in prison.’ (It may have been more than one prison)
Note that these BNs, in object position of Vs and Ps, have a number neutral interpretation, as suggested by the glosses (see Espinal 2010, Espinal and McNally 2011), and hence do not have inherent number. Therefore, we follow the hypothesis that they are morphologically unmarked for Number, and do not require a Num projection in syntax (see Munn and Schmitt 2005 for a similar claim with respect to Brazilian Portuguese). Besides Num, BNs in S also lack a Determiner. Several arguments support this claim: (i) BNs can occur neither in subject position (which is possible in BrP; Munn and Schmitt 2005, Müller 2002) nor as indirect objects, and (ii) cannot be assumed to move to a strong D0 position (as postulated for canonical arguments in Italian by Longobardi 1994, 2001) because BNs are not associated with a marker of determined atomic reference. We assume that the denotation of bare common count nouns, corresponding to structure (12a), is a property. More speciically, we assume that the BNs in (13) denote properties of kinds, where kinds are understood 
as intensional entities, without any reference to the particular individuals that might instantiate a kind (Espinal and McNally 2007, 2011; Dobrovie-Sorin and Pires de Oliveira 2007). Deinite nominals may have either the structure in (11) or the one in (12b). We postulate that the latter is the one that corresponds to deinite kinds, while the former corresponds to deinite singular or plural individual objects, 
i.e. non-kind entities. Let us start with by considering the minimal pair in (14a-b), as discussed in Espinal (2010).
(14) a. Tener  gripe (porcina).  have  lu  swine  ‘To have swine lu.’
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 b. Tener  la  gripe  (porcina).  have  the  lu  swine  ‘To have the swine lu.’
 c. *Tener  las  gripes  porcinas.
  have  the.pl  lu.pl  swine.pl
In (14a) “have–lu” or “have–swine lu” (“swine lu” being a subtype of 
“lu”) is a characterizing predicate of the external subject, in the sense that it adscribes a complex property of “having (swine) lu” to it. In (14b) the deinite D conveys a generalization and denotes the kind/class of viruses known as la 
gripe porcina “the swine lu”; this deinite D does not refer to the set of entities which belong to the kind, but rather names the kind itself, as proved by the fact that this nominal expression cannot occur in a deinite plural form (14c). This example shows that deinite kinds have no Number associated with them. 4Furthermore, only the deinite expression la gripe (porcina) (but not the BN) can occur in subject position of a kind-selecting predicate like estar por 
todas partes “to be widespread”, as shown in the minimal pair exempliied in 
(15). 5
(15) a. La  gripe  porcina está  por  todas  partes.  the lu  swine is  around  every  parts  ‘The swine lu is widespread.’
  *Gripe porcina está  por  todas  partes.  lu  swine is  around every  parts
4. There is a nice parallel in Russian for this type of examples. Consider the contrast in (i): (i) a.  U nih  svinoj  gripp  at them swine.sg lue.sg  ‘They have swine lue’
 b.  *U nih svinye grippy  at them swine.pl lue.pl 
The interpretation of (ia) is that for each individual referred to by the pronoun, the property of having swine lue applies. Normally, this distributive interpretation requires plural marking, as shown in (ii). However, since svinoj gripp denotes a property of kinds but not of individual objects, plural marking in (ib) is not possible. (ii)  a.  U nih novaja mashina  at them new.sg car.sg  ‘They have a new car.’  (one for all, collective interpretation) b.  U  nih  novye mashiny  at  them new.pl  car.pl  ‘They have new cars.’  (one car per person, i.e. distributive interpretation)5. As will soon become clear, the prediction we make here is that the plural counterpart of (15a) can only get a subkind interpretation. 
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The meaning of bare count nouns, as denoting properties of kinds of individuals 
of type ϊek,tϋ (Espinal and McNally 2007, Espinal 2010) is represented in (16b), 
where the superscript k indicates a kind-level individual x. 
(16) a. [NP N ]
 b. ψNω = λPλxk
 
[P(xk)] b′. ϊek,tϋ properties of kinds
The deinite D is formally translated as the iota-operator (Partee 1987), which combines with a property to give an entity-denoting expression, the atomic kind (xk). It is crucial to note that the iota-operator in this analysis binds variables of kinds, and this derivation syntactically corresponds to deinite nominal expressions not marked for Number. Therefore, structure (12b), repeated here as (17a), corresponds to what we name deinite kinds, not singular deinite kinds or singular generics.
(17) a. [DP D [NP N ]] 
 b. ψD Nω = λPιxk[P(xk)] b′.  ϊekϋ kind denotation
Recall that we rely on the hypothesis that there is no ambiguous Determiner. Romance languages may show overt Determiners preceding proper names. The syntactic form and semantics of this deinite Determiner is the same as for deinite kinds, where an overt Determiner precedes a common noun. 6 An argument in support of the syntactic-semantic correlation just made relies on speakers judgements about possible discourse relationships. Properties of kinds cannot introduce discourse referents, while kind denoting expressions can. The examples in (18) illustrate the fact that kinds are referred to in discourse by means of token discourse anaphors (like the Catalan third 
person accusative clitic el), whereas BNs introduce properties, and reference to them in discourse is only possible by means of a type anaphor (like the Catalan 
property-type anaphoric clitic en). 
(18)  CATALAN a. Alguna  cosa  va  exterminar  el  dodo,  però  què  el /  #en va  some  thing past exterminate  the  dodo  but  what  it.acc /  prop  past   exterminar?  exterminate  ‘The dodo was exterminated by something, but what was it?’  (Espinal 2010: note 19)
 
6. As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, it is not obvious that the deinite is not ambiguous if it can apply to both properties and proper names. However, in Partee’s (1987) model, proper names can be type-shifted to property-type expressions before the 
ι operator applies. 
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 b. Avui  porta  faldilla.  Li ’n  vam regalar
  today  wear.3sg  skirt  to.her  prop  past.1pl  give.present  una l’any  passat.
  one the.year  last  ‘Today she is wearing a skirt. We gave her one as a present last year.’  (Espinal and McNally 2011: ex.(17))
With these assumptions in mind, our main theoretical claim is that a deinite determiner, standardly interpreted as the iota operator ι, is responsible for instantiating a kind-denoting expression if, and only if, it applies directly to a Noun. Crucially, no Number is involved in the composition of a deinite kind 
interpretation.Let us now consider what happens when a syntactic projection that encodes Number is present. If Number is available, we assume that it relates properties of kinds to properties of objects, singular or plural, of that kind. It correlates with Carlson’s (1977) realization relation R (cf. Déprez 2005), although for him R is a two-place relationhip between stages and individuals.
(19) a. ψNum[–PL] Nω = λPλxkλyo [P(xk) ∧ R(P(xo), P(xk))] ϊeo,tϋ properties of objects	 	 ψNum[+PL] Nω = λPλxkλyo [P(xk) ∧ R(*P(xo), P(xk))]
In addition, the iota operator has a uniform semantics and applies either to properties of kinds (17b) or to properties of objects of this kind (20b). In the former case the output is a kind entity, in the latter case the output is an object 
entity. 
(20) a. [DP  D  [NumP  Num [NP  N ]] 
 b.  ψD Num Nω= λPλxkιxo
 
[P(xk) ∧ R(P(xo), P(xk))]  b′.  ϊeoϋ object denotation
We therefore claim and postulate that the difference between two types of entities, kinds and objects, initially proposed by Carlson, is morphosyntactically encoded by the presence or absence of Number.As for predicates, we assume the following typology: (i) kind-level 
predicates select for ϊekϋ arguments, (ii) individual-level predicates may select 
for ϊekϋ or ϊeoϋ, and (iii) stage-level predicates only select for ϊeoϋ. A model based on this predicate typology predicts the possibility to use a kind-referring deinite NP with k-level and i-level predicates, as illustrated in (21a-b). This predicts that deinite kinds must also be allowed as subjects of conjoined k-level and i-level predicates, as (21c) illustrates. 
(21) a. The blue whale is the largest mammal in the world. 
 b. The blue whale lives in all oceans, mainly in the Artic and the Antartic. c.  The blue whale lives in all oceans and is the largest mammal in the world. 
However, a s-level predicate makes it impossible to interpret the subject DP as a kind. In order to make a generic statement with a s-level predicate the 
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sentential operator GEN is required (Krifka et al. 1995). This type of abstract 
operator is what guarantees the appropriate interpretation for (22).
(22) A blue whale eats an average of three tones of food a day.
This approach predicts that a distinction is to be made in natural languages 
between deinite kinds (no Number projection in syntax, selected by k-level 
predicates and possibly also by i-level predicates), and (in)deinite generics (Number projection in syntax, GEN operator, selected by s-level predicates). And, more importantly, this difference in meaning is encoded, on the one hand, by the morphosyntactic speciication of Number on the DP, and, on the other hand, by a morhphosyntactic realization of the GEN operator. 
4. Deinite kinds in Spanish
The model we have just presented straightforwardly accounts for the S data in (23). Note that a kind-denoting subject is allowed with both k- and 
i-level predicates. If a singular deinite DP subject is combined with either an i-level or a s-level predicate, then the existence of a unique individual object 
is to be inferred. 7
(23) a. El  dodó se  extinguió  en  el  siglo  XVII. k-level; [DPD [NPN ]]
  the dodo cl  extinguished  in  the  century XVII
  ‘The dodo was extinct in the XVII century.’
 b. El  dodó vivió en  la  isla  Mauricio.   i-level; [DP D [NP N ]]
  the dodo lived  in  the  isle  Mauritius   or  [DP D [NumP Num [NP N ]]]  ‘The dodo lived in Mauritius Island.’
 c. El  dodó fue disecado  en  el  Museo Ashmolean.  s-level; 
  the dodo was dissected  in  the  museum Ashmolean  [DP D [NumP Num [NP N ]]]  ‘The dodo was dissected in the Ashmolean Museum.’
Our claim that there is no Number involved with the kind-referring DP subject is supported by the following piece of data: 
(24) a. La  nevera  se  inventó en  el  siglo  XVIII. 
  the fridge  cl invented.3sg in the century XVIII  ‘The fridge was invented in the XVIII century.’ 
 b. *Las  (dos) neveras  se  inventaron…
  the  two  fridges  cl invented.3pl 
7. Note that (23b) is ambiguous between the deinite kind reading, associated with a DP structure that does not project Number, and a deinite singular plus a taxonomic reading, the latter two associated with a DP structure that projects Number. We will come back to the taxonomic reading below.
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The ungrammaticality of (24b) supports the correlation we make between deinite kinds and absence of morphosyntactic Number. In other words, as already mentioned in the previous section, in the absence of any explicit evidence for semantic or morphosyntactic Number in subject DP position, we assume the minimal hypothesis that there is no Number projection. Deinite 
kinds are numberless. The reason for this generalization is that in S, as in many other languages (cf. Beyssade 2005 for French and Doron 2003 for Hebrew), there is a clear contrast between deinite kinds, conceived as intensional atomic entities, and maximal sums of individuals, conceived as extensional non-atomic (plural) entities. We come back to this contrast at the 
end of this section.Now, if Number is assumed to relate properties of kinds to properties of objects of that kind (as presented in Section 3), the next question that we have to answer is how we can account for Number (singular and plural) in DP structures that refer to subkinds, like in (25). Note that the DPs in (25a,b) contain either a demonstrative or a numeral.
(25) a. Esta  ballena  está en peligro de  extinción. subkind
  this  whale  is  on verge  of  extinction [DP D [NumP Num[–PL] [NP N ]]]  ‘This whale is on the verge of extinction.’
 b. Dos  ballenas están  en  peligro de  extinción. subkind
  two  whales  are  on  verge  of  extinction [DP D [NumP Num[+PL] [NP N ]]]  ‘Two whales are on the verge of extinction.’
 c. La  ballena  está  en peligro  de  extinción. kind
  the  whale  is  on verge  of  extinction [DP D [NP N ]]  ‘This whale is on the verge of extinction.’
One important difference between (25a-b) and (25c) is that in the former a lexical item such as clase, tipo “kind”, a kind-noun (Zamparelli 1995), can 
always be inserted. 8 With the deinite kind DP this possibility is discarded.
(26) a. Esta  clase  de  ballena  está  en peligro de  extinción.  this  kind of whale  is  on verge  of  extinction  ‘This kind of whale is on the verge of extinction.’
 b. Dos  tipos  de  ballenas están en peligro  de  extinción.   two  kinds of whales are  on verge  of  extinction  ‘This kind of whale is on the verge of extinction.’ c. *La  clase de ballena  está  en peligro  de  extinción. 9  the  kind of whale  is  on verge  of  extinction
8. See also Carslon (1977/1980:26) for a speciic reference to English names of kinds 
of things.9. If the subject of this sentence is modiied by a relative clause, the example is grammatical with a subkind interpretation, just like (26a-b). This is just an additional piece of evidence that shows that relative clauses, like numerals and demonstratives, need more 
functional structure above the noun.
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Going back to example (24b), it is interesting to note that it can only be turned into a grammatical sentence if a noun that names kinds of things is overtly speciied. Example (27) necessarily conveys a taxonomic interpretation.
(27) Las dos  clases  de  neveras se  inventaron … the  two  kinds of fridges  cl invented.3pl  ‘The two kinds of fridges were invented…’
The morphosyntactic DP structure corresponding to the examples in (26) and (27) is the maximal one, containing both Number and Determiner, as represented in (20b) and with the semantic type in (20b′). Let us now consider the problem posed by the data in (25a-b). It is 
obvious that an ϊeoϋ-type object denotation cannot combine in a straightforward way with a k-level predicate like estar en peligro de extinción “to be on the 
verge of extinction”, unless a semantic operation of type shifting guarantees 
that the expression denoting individual entities (i.e. esta ballena, dos ballenas) is turned into a class-denoting expression, namely a subkind. Provisionally, we propose the operation in (28) 10.
(28) Type-shifting to subkinds
 ϊeoϋ → ϊeskϋ Condition: when an individual object is the semantic argument corresponding to a selected k-argument of a k-level or an i-level predicate.
This type-shifting operation, conceived as a last resort process, guarantees an appropriate semantic composition for the sentences in (25a,b). It also predicts that an example such as (29) only allows a subkind interpretation, even in the case the speaker holds a speciic iPod computer in his hand. 11
(29) Steve Jobs  inventó  este  iPod. Steve Jobs invented this  iPod ‘Steve jobs invented this iPod.’
The operation stated in (28) predicts the possibility of obtaining a subkind reading when a Number projection, either singular or plural, is overt and a Determiner projection, either an (in)deinite or a demonstrative, is also overt, 
10. See also Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2010) for a kind lifting rule that shifts transitive verbs (or verb-preposition combinations) from an object-level meaning to a kind-level meaning, although we do not share with these authors the hypothesis that weak deinites refer to kinds.
11. It seems that there is an additional puzzle that appears to be related to the presence of a demonstrative. In examples like (29) an additional interpretation is available: the one that refers to representative instantiations of the subkind. This observation is also true for Russian demonstrative determiners, discussed in the next section. 
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but the semantics of the DP cannot combine with the selecting requirements of the VP predicate.
The conclusion to be drawn is that both subkinds and kinds require a 
D projection, a deinite D in the case of kinds and an (in)deinite D in the case of subkinds. But, in addition, subkinds are built on Number, either singular 
or plural. The inal contrast we would like to point out for a Romance language like S is that deinite kinds must be distinguished from maximal sums or maximal sets, as has already been claimed for French (Beyssade 2005). Let 
us consider (30).
(30) a. La ballena  está  en  peligro  de extinción. kind
  the  whale  is  on  verge  of extinction  ‘All whales are on the verge of extinction.’
 b. (Todas) las ballenas  están  en  peligro  de  extinción. maximal sum
  all  the whales   are  on  verge  of extinction  ‘All whales are on the verge of extinction.’
The deinite DP in subject position in (30a) corresponds to a deinite kind. It denotes neither an individual atomic reference nor a sum of atoms; it denotes the name of a kind, the name of the property denoted by the Noun ballena 
“whale”. By contrast, the deinite plural DP in subject position in (30b) is ambiguous: it may either refer to the maximal sum of individuals which instantiate the kind, or the maximal sum of subkinds of the kind ballena 
“whale”. This last claim suggests a possible alternative to our account in (28) for subkind interpretation. In particular, it could be that Number is responsible for two possible outputs: either properties of objects, as represented in (19), or properties of subkinds, as represented in (31) (cf. Zamparelli 1995), thus suggesting that Number is ambiguous. 
(31) a. ψNum[–PL] Nω = λPλxkλysk [P(xk) ∧ R(P(xsk), P(xk))]  ϊesk,tϋ properties of subkinds
 b.  ψNum[+PL] Nω = λPλxkλysk [P(xk) ∧ R(*P(xsk), P(xk))]
Disambiguation between (19) and (31) will come up at the time of meaning composition, when the requirements of the predicate will be attended.
5. Deinite kinds in Russian 
In this section, we show how our analysis extends to R. As we argue below, in the absence of an overt determiner, R has the same type of defnite kind-referring expressions as S, both from a syntactic and a semantic viewpoint.Consider irst the set of representative examples in (32). Just like in S, if what looks like a bare subject dront “dodo” is selected by either a k-level (32a) or an i-level (32b) predicate, its interpretation corresponds to a kind denoting 
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entity. But reference to an individual object is allowed with an i-level predicate, 
as shown in (32b), and required with an s-level predicate, as in (32c). 
(32) a. Dront  ischez  s  lica  zemli  v XVII veke. k-level; 
  dodo  disappeared  from  surface  of.earth  in XVII century [DP D [NP N]]  ‘The dodo was extinct in the XVII century.’ 
 b.  Dront  ne  umel  letat.’ i-level; 
  dodo  not  know.pst  ly [DP D [NP N ]] or  ‘The dodo could not ly.’  [DP D [NumP Num [NP N ]]
 c. Dront  byl raschlenen  v  muzee  Ashmola. s-level; 
  dodo  was dissected  in  museum  of.Ashmol [DP D [NumP Num [NP N ]]  ‘The dodo was dissected in the Ashmolean museum.’
These two interpretations of the subject (i.e. ϊekϋ and ϊeoϋ) follow from our assumptions laid out in Section 3, especially from the syntax-semantics mappings of the nominal expressions in combination with the typology of 
predicates. Next, we argue that kind-referring subjects in R involve a null Determiner, which encodes the ι operator in the examples in (32). In making this claim we rely on previous work by Pereltsvaig (2006, 2007) who provides convincing arguments in favour of the Universal DP hypothesis by showing that both DP structures and QP/NP structures are available in R and the difference between them is syntactically and semantically motivated. In this paper, we follow Pereltsvaig in assuming that the DP structure is available in R, even though no overt article is used to realize the D projection. Among the diagnostics proposed by Pereltsvaig (2006, 2007) to distinguish between NP and DP structures in R are the following: (i) DPs, but not NPs, allow for the expression of speciicity; (ii) DPs, but not NPs, allow for the expression of quantity; (iii) DPs, but not NPs, control PRO, anaphora and trigger agreement. We use one of these diagnostics, namely, pronoun and anaphora control, to show that kind-referring subjects have a DP structure. As shown in (33) below, kind-referring subjects can be antecedents for personal and relexive pronouns: 
(33) a.  Panda nahodit’sja na grani ischeznovenija. 
  panda  is.found  on verge extinction.gen
  Ona  javljaetsja  oicial’nym  simvolom  vsemirnogo  fonda dikoj prirody.
  she  appears  oficial  symbol  world  fund  wild  nature
  ‘The panda is on the verge of extinction. It is the oficial symbol of WWF.’
 b.  Slon  skoro  budet  zanesen  v  Krasnuyu  Knigu  esli 
  elephant  soon  will  listed  in  red  book  if 
  na  nego  ne  perestanut  ohotit’sja. 
  on  him  not  stop  hunt
  ‘The elephant will soon be listed in the IUCN Red List if people don’t stop 
hunting it.’
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 c.  Dront ischez s lica zemli potomu chto ne mog 
  dodo  disappeared  from surface  of.earth because that  not could 
  zaschitit’  sebja  ot  napadenija. 
  protect  self from  attacks  ‘The dodo was extinct because it could not protect itself from being attacked.’
In contrast, a property-type BN, even when morphologically speciied for plural number, does not allow for pronominal reference: 
(34) Ja  budu  ballotirovat’sja  v  presidenty. *Ih/*Ego  vybirajut  raz  v  shest’ let. 
 I  will  run for  presidents. *They/Him  elect once in  six  years.
 ‘I will run for president. The president is elected once in six years’
We take examples in (33) to support the DP status of kind-referring subjects. We therefore claim that the semantic representation of the kind-referring subjects in (32) and (33) involves the ι operator (i.e. a covert deinite article) and its syntactic representation involves a DP projection, just like in the case of deinite kinds in S (see (17) above, repeated in (35)): 
(35) a. [DP D [NP N ]] 
 b. ψD Nω = λPιxk[P(xk)] b′.  ϊekϋ kind denotation
Having argued for the presence of D, we now turn to illustrate that there is no Number involved in kind-referring expressions. Supporting evidence for the absence of Number in the denotation of kinds is given in the following example, which illustrates that numerical expressions are incompatible with deinite kinds:
(36) *Dva dronta ischezli  v  XVII veke.   two  dodos  disappeared  in  XVII century   ‘??Two dodos disappeared in the XVII century’
This example illustrates that if Number is imposed on nominal expressions that refer to species, the output is ill-formed, even when a taxonomic reading is intended. Hence, we conclude, that a kind-referring expression is incompatible with number, both syntactically and semantically. Note, however, that in R it is possible to use an overt demonstrative pronoun to modify a kind-referring subject, as in (37a). Such an example only allows a taxonomic (subkind) interpretation, similar to (37b), which involves 
the lexical noun vid “type”: 
(37) a. Etot  dront ischez  v  XVII veke.
  this.sg  dodo  disappeared  in  XVII century  ‘This dodo disappeared in the XVII century.’
 b. Etot  vid  dronta  ischez  v XVII veke.
  this.sg type dodo.gen.sg disappeared  in XVII century  ‘This type of dodo disappeared in the XVII century’
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Unlike in S, this taxonomic interpretation is not available with numerals in 
R (cf. the ungrammatical example in (36)). Numerals in this language must pattern with lexical items such as vid, tip, class “type, kind, class”, which cannot directly combine with a kind-referring expression, as shown in (38c). For S, this last phenomenon was illustrated in example (26). However, the lexical items referring to classes in R occur freely with demonstrative pronouns and numerals, as shown in (38a) and (38b). 
(38) a.  Etot  vid  kita/kitov  ischez  s  lica  zemli
  this.sg  type. sg whale.gen.sg/gen.pl  disappeared  from  surface of.earth
  sovsem nedavno.
  just  recently
  ‘This type of whale has become extinct only recently’
 b.  Dva  vida  kitov  ischezli  s  lica  zemli
  two  type. gen.pl whale. gen.pl disappear  from surface  of.earth
  sovsem  nedavno.
  just  recently
  ‘Two types of whales has become extinct only recently’
 c. *Vid kita  ischez  s  lica  zemli  sovsem  nedavno.
  type  whale  disappeared  from  surface  of.earth  just  recently
In our analysis, a subkind interpretation is built on Number, either singular or plural, as the examples in (37) and (38a,b) properly illustrate for R. In these examples, we see the overt number speciication on the noun in Genitive case.It is interesting to observe that in more traditional analyses of R nominals, demonstrative pronouns, as well as quantiiers and numerals, are taken to be “actualizers”, i.e. the elements that, in the absence of articles, actualize a common noun or, in other words, the elements that indicate a referential status of a common noun (Padučeva 1985). We interpret these elements, actualizers, as functions that are “parasitic” on number. According to our hypothesis, number corresponds to a semantic function that maps properties of kinds to properties of individuals. If actualizers are referential indicators, they can appear only in those conigurations where number is involved, because they indicate the referential status of individual objects. Crucial to our argumentation is the fact that deinite kinds are incompatible with the presence of overt morpho-syntactic actualizers of any 
type. We interpret this fact as supporting our conclusion that all actualizers rely on the presence of Number in morphology, syntax and semantics.Finally, we would like to сonsider the contrast in (39):
(39) a. Kit  nahoditsja  pod  ugrozoj  ischeznovenija kind (ι)
  whale is.found under  danger  of.extinction  ‘The whale is in danger of extinction.’
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 b. Vse  kity  nahodjatsja  pod  ugrozoj  ischeznovenija maximal sum
  all  whale.pl are.found under  danger  of.extinction  ‘All the whales are in danger of extinction.’
 c. kity  nahodjatsja  pod  ugrozoj  ischeznovenija kind (∩)
  whale.pl are.found  under  danger  of.extinction  ‘Whales are in danger of extinction.’
The subject in (39a) corresponds to what we have called a deinite kind and is parallel to the S example in (30a). In the case of (39b), the plural subject shows the same type of ambiguity as in the corresponding S example in 
(30b). In particular, vse kity “all whales” can either refer to a maximal sum of individuals instantiating the whale kind or the maximal sum of subkinds 
of whales (the blue whale, the white whale, etc.). Finally, (39c) contains a bare plural in subject position, which does not have any correspondence in S, but correlates with a mass-like interpretation of bare plural kind-referring expressions, like in E.We take (39a) and (39c) to indicate that languages can have two ways to refer to kinds: either by means of deinite kinds, which have been the object of our analysis in this paper, or by means of bare plurals, a discussion of which is outside the scope of this paper. It seems that R, like E, can employ both means, whereas in S, only deinite kinds are possible. Note that, according to the nominal mapping parameter of Chierchia (1998), both E and R belong to the type of [+arg, +pred] languages, whereas S, as well all the other Romance languages, is of the type [–arg, +pred]. We think that Chierchia’s typology, at least at irst sight, correlates nicely with the possible ways of referring to kinds that a language allows for. Assuming that bare plurals are derived by Chierchia’s ∩ operator, it follows that [–arg, +pred] languages cannot have bare plurals in argument positions unless a D is applied. Both R and E, however, have an option of referring to kinds by means of bare plurals. We ind this 
observation very interesting but we will have to elaborate on this idea in future 
research.
6. Conclusions and predictions
Our proposal, based on the general assumption that the difference between object entities ϊeoϋ and kind entities ϊekϋ relies on the presence or absence of Number in the structure of nominal expressions, has several 
consequences. Our irst prediction is that deinite kinds cannot combine with 
predicates that encode plurality, like, for instance, gather, be numerous, etc. Chierchia (1998:381) make a similar observation, but his explanation of this phenomena is different from ours and relies on the presence of a MASS operator (see (8) above). 
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(40) a. *The tiger  gathered  in the jungle b. *El  tigre  se reunió  en la selva
    the tiger cl gathered in the jungle c. *Tigr  sobralsja v dzungljah
    tiger  gathered.refl in jungle.pl
Our explanation of this fact relies on the absence of Number in the syntactic and semantic representation of deinite kinds. In the absence of a projection that encodes Number, the subject cannot agree with a predicate that requires plurality. In contrast to numberless deinite kinds, plural deinite DPs, which, according to our proposal, denote maximal sums of individuals, are ine in this position: 
(41) a. The tigers  gather  in the jungle. b. Los  tigres  se reúnen  en la selva.
  the.pl tiger.pl CL gather in the jungle c. Vse tigry  sobirajutsja v dzungljah.  All  tiger.pl  gather.refl in jungle.pl
The second consequence of our analysis is that deinite kinds cannot trigger a generic interpretation with s-level predicates, because they are not selected by this type of predicates: 
(42) a. The tiger  ate  in the jungle. b. El  tigre  comió  en la selva.  the tiger ate in the jungle c. Tigr  poel v dzungljah.
  tiger  ate.perf in jungle.pl
The subject of the three examples in (42) can only have an individual 
reference. The contrast between (42) and (43) shows that a generic (or habitual) interpretation with a s-level predicate is independent of the deinite DP in subject position, but is related to the presence of a generic operator instantiated by means of the present tense: 
(43) a. The tiger  eats  in the jungle b. El  tigre  come  en la selva  the tiger eats in the jungle c. Tigr  est v dzungljah
  tiger  eat.imperf in jungle.pl
Our third prediction is that deinite kinds and deinite plurals have different 
interpretations in the languages that we have considered. Deinite plurals are not to be interpreted as denoting kinds, but the maximal sum of individuals that satisfy the property denoted by the noun (Beyssade 2005). 
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The fourth consequence of our analysis is that we expect all languages that have Determiners (null or overt) to have deinite kinds. However, as we noted at the end of the previous section, nothing prevents languages from using other means to refer to kinds, as, for instance, bare plurals in E (Carlson 1980, Chierchia 1998) and in R. Our hypothesis is that the availability of bare plurals depends on the semantic status of the nominal expressions in a language, in accordance with the Nominal Mapping Parameter (Chierchia 1998). In particular, languages whose nominal expressions are [–arg, +pred], like S, always require a Determiner (null or overt) to realize a semantic argument, and deinite kinds are one sort of semantic argument. On the other hand, languages whose nominal expressions are [+arg, +pred], like E and R, in addition to deinite kinds, also allow for bare plurals as kind arguments, because they can derive an argument interpretation by means of the ∩ operator. This means that Germanic and Slavic languages show two means to express kinds in the nominal domain: the ι operator, that corresponds to D, and the 
∩ operator, that corresponds to Num[+PL], whereas Romance languages can only rely on the ι operator.Finally, it should be noted that our proposal comes closer to the analysis of Dayal (2004) in treating the deinite article uniformly as a ι operator and in assuming that there are two ways to refer to kinds, by means of ι or by means 
of ∩. However, in Dayal's approach, deinite kinds are singular, whereas we argue that they are numberless.  Dayal takes deinite kinds to be syntactically singular, although conceptually based on pluralities. In our approach, deinite kinds are the basic entities derived by a direct application of the ι operator to the property of kind denoted by a common noun. There is no plurality involved in the denotation of deinite kinds, neither conceptually nor grammatically.Another crucial difference is that in order to derive a subkind (taxonomic) interpretation of nominal expressions, Dayal relies on the hypothesis that “common nouns […] systematically denote properties of ordinary individuals or properties of sub-kinds” (p.424). We do not derive the taxonomic reading by building an ambiguity into the denotation of the common noun or into the determiner: the presence or absence of Num does this work.To match the syntax and semantics of nominal expressions, we commit to stricter mapping rules. In particular, if the interpretation requires 
the ι operator, we assume that it is relected in syntax by the presence of D projection. Thus, unlike Dayal, we argue that deinite kinds in R do involve a null determiner and that Number is independent of D.As for crosslinguistic differences, Dayal attributes the difference between E and Romance languages to different lexicalization patterns. In particular, in E the ∩ operator is not lexicalized, whereas in Romance languages the deinite article is said to lexicalize both the ι and the ∩ operators. In contrast, we attribute the difference between E and Romance languages to Chierchia’s 
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typology of nominal reference, which blocks the application of the ∩ operator in Romance altogether. According to our analysis, in S kind nominal expressions corresponding to E bare plurals are absent, and deinite plurals do not refer to kinds but to the maximal sum of individuals satisfying the property denoted by the noun. By contrast, in R neither ∩ nor ι are lexicalized, but there is syntactic and semantic evidence of the existence of these operators. As a inal note, it seems reasonable to suggest that if a language has more than one way to refer to kinds, like E or R, only one of the possible constructions would be the unmarked option. In E and R, this is what bare plurals do, whereas deinite kinds are pragmatically restricted. However, in S and in other Romance languages deinite kinds are the only option to refer to kinds, therefore they are not pragmatically restricted. 
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résumé
Dans cet article, nous défendons trois hypothèses. Premièrement, toutes les 
langues qui possèdent des déterminants (nuls ou manifestes) ont des termes 
d’espèces déinis, une possibilité qui n’empêche pas les langues de recourir à 
d’autres moyens pour faire référence aux espèces. Deuxièmement, les espèces 
sont dénotées par des DPs déinis sans Nombre. Troisièmement, l’interprétation 
de sous-espèces se fait sur Nombre. Nous soutiendrons empiriquement ces 
hypothèses en nous appuyant sur l’analyse contrastive de deux langues 
qui mettent en œuvre des stratégies opposées pour marquer la déinitude : 
l’espagnol, une langue romane avec articles, et le russe, une langue slave sans 
article. Nous faisons la prédiction que les termes d’espèces déinis ne peuvent 
pas se combiner avec des prédicats qui encode la pluralité, ne peuvent pas 
déclencher une interprétation générique avec des prédicats s-level, et ont une 
interprétation différente de celle associée aux déinis pluriels.
mots-clés
Interprétation des termes d’espèces, déterminant déini, nombre, russe, 
espagnol.

